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Historians often interpret American political thought in the early twentieth century through an 
opposition between the technocratic power of expertise and the deliberative promise of 
democracy, respectively represented by Walter Lippmann and John Dewey. This article 
explores Lippmann’s concurrent controversy with Lewis Terman about intelligence testing, in 
which Dewey also intervened. It argues that the Lippmann-Terman controversy dramatized 
and developed a range of ideas about the politics of expertise in a democracy, which centered 
on explaining how democratic citizens might engage with and control the authority of experts. 
It concludes by examining the controversy’s influence on democratic theory. 
 
 
In October 1922, the journalist Walter Lippmann intervened in a debate about democracy. 
Expert psychologists employed by the U.S. Army during the First World War had measured 
the intelligence of over 1,700,000 soldiers, often using tests based on a revision of the Binet-
Simon intelligence scale developed by the Stanford professor Lewis Terman.1 After the war, 
they claimed that the “average intelligence” of the white draft, “when transmuted… into terms 
of mental age,” was “about 13 years (13.08).”2 When transformed into a statistic about the 
average mental age of Americans, this claim generated an anxious debate about the very 
possibility of democracy in America. Lippmann contested it so prominently, and Terman 
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2 Robert M. Yerkes, ed., Psychological Examining in the United States Army (Washington, DC, 1921), 785.  
   2 
responded so vociferously, that contemporaries spoke of “the Lippmann-Terman 
controversy.”3 
In subsequent scholarship, however, this controversy has been overshadowed by a 
different debate about democracy. For, six months earlier, Lippmann had published his classic 
study of Public Opinion, which famously concluded that only a bureaucracy of experts could 
make democracy work.4 Historians habitually read this text alongside The Phantom Public, 
which Lippmann published in 1925, and against The Public and Its Problems, which the 
philosopher John Dewey published in 1927. In what has come to be known as “the Lippmann-
Dewey debate,” Dewey’s optimistic and systematic democratic theory responds to the 
pessimism of Lippmann’s “democratic elitism.” Dewey stands for education, government by 
the people, and the promise of democracy; Lippmann represents expertise, government by 
elites, and the power of technocracy. As recent research has shown, scholarly discussions of 
this debate emerged in the 1980s as a way to make the case for a cultural turn within 
communications studies.5 But it quickly became and continues to be an influential heuristic 
device for interpreting the intellectual history of American democracy in the early twentieth 
century.6 
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 This article argues that the Lippmann-Terman controversy constitutes a significant 
episode in the history of American political thought, which provides a framework for revisiting 
the opposition between democracy and expertise that the Lippmann-Dewey debate has 
established. Historians of science have shown that the controversy helped generate enormous 
publicity for intelligence testing, and that it shaped debates about education policy, 
meritocracy, and eugenics.7 But they have been less concerned to explore the controversy’s 
implications for democratic theory.8 And this is odd, for Lippmann criticized intelligence 
testing while writing his major theories of democracy. If his affinity for experts was so great, 
then why take on a leading purveyor of psychological expertise like Lewis Terman? Moreover, 
how should historians account for the fact that Dewey himself intervened in the controversy, 
but on Lippmann’s side? This article seeks to show that the Lippmann-Terman controversy 
dramatized and developed a range of ideas about the politics of expertise in a democracy, which 
then influenced the arguments of contemporary democratic theory. It also suggests that “the 
Lippmann-Dewey debate” distorts historical understanding of American political thought in 
the early twentieth century, insofar as this heuristic pits democracy against expertise when what 
mattered to Lippmann and Dewey (and others) was understanding the political relationship 
between them.   
                                                 
7 Franz Samelson, “Putting Psychology on the Map: Ideology and Intelligence Testing,” in Allan R. Buss, ed., 
Psychology in Social Context (New York, 1979), 103-68; Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The 
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207-8; Henry L. Minton, Lewis M. Terman: Pioneer in Psychological Testing (New York, 1988), 102-4; Paul 
Davis Chapman, Schools as Sorters: Lewis M. Terman, Applied Psychology, and the Intelligence Testing 
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8 Thus the best recent history of intelligence testing relegates Public Opinion to a footnote (Carson, Measure of 
Merit, 374n80), where readers are referred to Lippmann’s text “for a more jaundiced appreciation of mass 
democracy produced at almost the same time.” 
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 Because it did much to shape this understanding, the Lippmann-Terman controversy 
also contributes to broader debates about the authority of the social sciences in modern 
America. Historians have long quarreled about the institutional, ideological, and intellectual 
dynamics of social-scientific expertise in the United States, and especially about how these 
dynamics relate to the phenomenon of professionalization.9 A more recent historiography, 
alongside the field of science and technology studies, has focused on the public reception of 
social science, and shown how professional experts engaged in diverse exchanges with non-
professional audiences.10 The Lippmann-Terman controversy is particularly productive in 
these contexts, for here historians have a moment when leading democratic theorists sought to 
influence “the publicity of knowledge” about some expertise that was widely perceived to 
imperil democracy.11 Here, the intellectual culture of “scientific democracy” confronted the 
relationship between professional experts and democratic citizens as an urgent political 
problem.12 And by exposing a range of practical and theoretical attempts to address this 
problem, the controversy shows how the authority of expertise in modern America once 
depended on unstable and ultimately rhetorical processes of democratic persuasion. This 
article, then, will first explore Lippmann’s critique, then Dewey’s intervention, and then 
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Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York, 2007); Sheila Jasanoff, Science and Public Reason (London, 
2012).   
11 Joel Isaac, “Tangled Loops: Theory, History, and the Human Sciences in Modern America,” Modern 
Intellectual History, 6/2 (2009), 397-424, at 416. 
12 Andrew Jewett, Science, Democracy, and the American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War 
(Cambridge, 2012), 172-6. 
   5 
Terman’s response. It will conclude by considering both The Phantom Public and The Public 
and Its Problems in the context of the controversy.  
 
I 
 
The sensational statistic that the average mental age of Americans was about thirteen generated 
a cacophonous political debate in the early 1920s. For some scientists and publicists, such as 
the Anglo-American psychologist William McDougall, the army tests proved that genetic 
inheritance determined intelligence, which implied that most democratic citizens were 
biologically irredeemable.13 The historian and white supremacist Lothrop Stoddard went 
further, and used the tests to make the case for a racially pure political order: “Neo-
Aristocracy.”14 Intelligence testing thus gave seemingly scientific support to explicitly anti-
democratic arguments, which often involved eugenic ideas and nativist policies.15 Always at 
stake in the debate as a whole was the scientific authority of psychological expertise, which 
psychologists had maintained through decades of public interventions and professional 
innovations that stressed their credibility as scientists.16 Intelligence testers had a particular 
need to persuade diverse audiences that their expertise was scientific, for they sought to shape 
public policy, especially education policy, and so found both intellectual substance and 
                                                 
13 William McDougall, Is America Safe for Democracy? (New York, 1921), 42-50. On him, see Anne C. Rose, 
“William McDougall, American Psychologist: A Reconsideration of Nature-Nurture Debates in the Interwar 
United States,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 52/4 (2016), 325-48. 
14 Lothrop Stoddard, The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under Man (New York, 1922), 57-74, 
263.  
15 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, 
1983), 270-7; Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Hereditary (New 
York, 1985), 74-83; Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern 
America, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, 2016), 50-1. For the global intellectual context, see Alison Bashford, Global 
Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth (New York, 2014), 107-32. 
16 Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet (Chicago, 1972), 169-85; Jill G. Morawski and 
Gail A. Hornstein, “Quandry of the Quacks: The Struggle for Expert Knowledge in American Psychology, 1890-
1940,” in JoAnne Brown and David K. van Keuren, eds. The Estate of Social Knowledge (Baltimore, 1991), 106-
10.  
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rhetorical force in eye-catching categories like “mental age.”17 Lewis Terman navigated these 
public and professional networks so successfully, and his revision of the Binet-Simon 
intelligence scale worked so well, that he had become one of the most prominent intelligence 
testers in the United States by the early 1920s.18 
 Within the academy, the Columbia educator William Bagley emerged as a powerful 
critic of intelligence testing. He argued that Terman’s tests failed to show that intelligence was 
hereditary, and that they threatened “to overturn the entire theory and practice of democratic 
education.”19 Terman countered that his data proved intelligence to be “pretty largely 
determined by native endowment,” but added that testing could improve democratic education 
by “making the most of every child, the dull as well as the bright.”20 For Bagley, a staunch 
educationalist, the tests undermined the very idea of democratic education; for Terman, a 
committed eugenicist, they underlined what could be democratic in education.21 But for both, 
the politics of the tests turned on how the intelligence of individuals, whether inherited or 
achieved, related to their subsequent merit in a democratic society.22 Among others who 
rejected the idea that biology determined intelligence, black scholars were notably robust, 
though some, like Horace Mann Bond, did not deny that intelligence was measurable, for the 
tests could contest racial hierarchies in the name of merit.23 Terman and Bagley, meanwhile, 
                                                 
17 JoAnne Brown, “Mental Measurements and the Rhetorical Force of Numbers,” in The Estate of Social 
Knowledge, 134-52; Brown, The Definition of a Profession: The Authority of Metaphor in the History of 
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19 William C. Bagley, “Educational Determinism: Or Democracy and the I.Q.,” School and Society, 15 (1922), 
373-84; reprinted in Bagley, Determinism in Education (Baltimore, 1925), 11-32, at 17. 
20 Lewis M. Terman, “The Psychological Determinist; or Democracy and the I.Q.,” Journal of Educational 
Research, 6/1 (1922), 57-62, at 60 and 62. See also William C. Bagley, “Professor Terman’s Determinism: A 
Rejoinder,” Journal of Educational Research, 6/5 (1922), 371-85. 
21 On Terman and eugenics, see Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 143-50; and Stern, Eugenic Nation, 92-9. On Bagley 
and his context, see Thomas D. Fallace, “Educators Confront the ‘Science’ of Racism, 1898-1925,” Journal of 
Curriculum Studies, 48/2 (2016), 252-70. 
22 Henry L. Minton, “Lewis M. Terman and Mental Testing: In Search of the Democratic Ideal,” in Michael M. 
Sokal, ed. Psychological Testing and American Society (New Brunswick, 1987), 95-112, at 103-4; Carson, 
Measure of Merit, 248-9.  
23 Horace Mann Bond, “Intelligence Tests and Propaganda,” The Crisis, June 1924, 61-4; Wayne J. Urban, “The 
Black Scholar and Intelligence Testing: The Case of Horace Mann Bond,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral 
Sciences, 25/4 (1989), 323-34. See also William B. Thomas, “Black Intellectuals’ Critique of Early Mental 
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formed a committee of (white) progressive social scientists to gather more evidence about the 
relationship between inheritance and education.24 This debate soon became known as “the 
nature-nurture controversy,” and it continues to animate arguments about democracy and 
meritocracy.25 
 Lippmann, however, approached intelligence testing from an unusual angle, for Public 
Opinion appeared in April 1922. He had worked on the book since before the First World War, 
but published it in a context where the army tests were generating widespread pessimism about 
the intellectual capacities of democratic citizens.26 The book cautioned against “loose talk” 
about “race psychology” (“until you have thoroughly failed to see tradition being handed on… 
it is a solecism of the worst order to ascribe political differences to the germ plasm”), and did 
not discuss intelligence testing explicitly.27 But Lippmann’s emphasis on the limited capacities 
of democratic citizens had an easy resonance with the army tests, which made Public Opinion 
seem obvious to some. For instance, the cultural critic H. L. Mencken reviewed Lippmann’s 
book in terms that drew directly on the intelligence testing debate. Complaining that Public 
Opinion would have worked better as “a scientific presentation of the fundamental mental and 
gastric processes of the mobs,” Mencken observed that most “Baltimorons” confronted 
problems every day that went “far beyond their intelligence.”28  
                                                 
Testing: A Little-Known Saga of the 1920s,” American Journal of Education, 90/3 (1982), 258-92; and cf. Erik 
Linstrum, Ruling Minds: Psychology in the British Empire (Cambridge, MA, 2016), 83-115. 
24 William C. Bagley to Lewis M. Terman, October 26, 1923, Lewis Madison Terman Papers, Department of 
Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University, Box 14, Folder 28; Terman, “The Possibilities 
and Limitations of Training,” Journal of Educational Research, 10/5 (1924), 335-43. 
25 Guy M. Whipple, ed., The Twenty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education: Nature 
and Nurture, 2 vols. (Bloomington, 1928); Lewis M. Terman, “The Influence of Nature and Nurture Upon 
Intelligence Scores: An Evaluation of the Evidence in Part I of the 1928 Yearbook of the National Society for the 
Study of Education,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 19/6 (1928), 362-73; Nicholas Pastore, The Nature-
Nurture Controversy (New York, 1949). Recent analyses include Steven Fraser, ed., The Bell Curve Wars: Race, 
Intelligence, and the Future of America (New York, 1995); and Nicholas Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret 
History of the American Meritocracy (New York, 1999). 
26 For his earliest notes, see “Notes on Public Opinion – Sebasco, Maine, June 1914,” Walter Lippmann Papers, 
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Box 219, Folder 305. 
27 Lippmann, Public Opinion, 93. 
28 William H. Nolte, ed., H. L. Mencken’s Smart Set Criticism (Ithica, 1968), 121-30. The word “moron,” much 
used by Mencken, had been invented in 1910 as a technical term for classifying intelligence: see Zenderland, 
Measuring Minds, 102-3. 
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 One of the subtlest responses to the book came in a letter Lippmann received in July 
1922 from Carter Goodrich, a young economist at Amherst whose book, The Frontier of 
Control: A Study in British Workshop Politics, Lippmann had liked and helped publish two 
years earlier.29 Goodrich returned the favor with a five-page analysis of Public Opinion, which 
began with praise for various aspects of the book, including Lippmann’s “excellent and careful 
phrasings” in “your cautions against ‘ascribing political differences to the germ plasm.’” But 
Goodrich had doubts when it came to “your main dilemma, that of democracy in a Great 
Society.”30 This was certainly the dilemma, for, as contemporaries knew and historians know, 
Lippmann had been much influenced by the British social theorist Graham Wallas, who argued 
in The Great Society (1914) that the complexity and pluralism of industrial capitalism made 
“the general social organization of a large modern state” both inevitably important for expertise 
and incredibly difficult to control.31 Indeed, very many Anglophone progressives agreed that 
specialized expert knowledge formed a necessary part of understanding and reforming mass 
society.32 Goodrich, however, concentrated on the figure at the center of Lippmann’s argument: 
the ordinary amateur citizen. “That ‘amateur’ seems to me the key of things,” Goodrich 
observed, before arguing that at the end of Public Opinion this figure “gets pushed aside…. in 
your enthusiasm for your experts you have a little forgotten to put your amateurs into relation 
with them.” For Goodrich, the dilemma of democracy in the Great Society turned on this 
relationship between amateur and expert, and here he asked Lippmann for more: “What is the 
amateur to do about governing? (Surely something, if it’s democracy…)” What was needed, 
and what Public Opinion lacked, was a convincing account of the politics of expertise in a 
                                                 
29 Carter L. Goodrich, The Frontier of Control: A Study of British Workshop Politics (New York, 1920); Walter 
Lippmann to Goodrich, 20 Feb. 1920, Lippmann Papers, Box 11, Folder 465.  
30 Carter L. Goodrich to Walter Lippmann, 10 July 1922, Lippmann Papers, Box 11, Folder 465. 
31 Graham Wallas, The Great Society: A Psychological Analysis (London, 1914), v.  
32 James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American 
Thought (New York, 1986), 267-77; John A. Thompson, Reformers and War: American Progressive Publicists 
and the First World War (Cambridge, 1987), 64-5; Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a 
Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 25-8. 
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democracy. Goodrich did not produce this himself, but did suggest “adding a chapter on, say, 
‘The Amateur’s Control of the Experts.’”33 
 For Goodrich, “control” animated politics under modern capitalism, because it 
provided the language and mechanisms by which unions and other interests demanded 
reform.34 Union demands were in essence political because they were “concerned with 
authority relationships” throughout industrial society, and sought to use “workshop politics” to 
change social and economic conditions.35 Applying this conceptual framework to Public 
Opinion, Goodrich pushed Lippmann on exactly how amateur citizens could engage in political 
relationships with (that is, control) professional expertise. This went beyond the criticisms of 
Dewey (and others) that Lippmann had overplayed the importance of expertise and 
underplayed that of journalism, for Goodrich claimed that professional expertise in modern 
democracy had an inevitable authority that created distinctive political problems for amateur 
publics.36 Engaging with Wallas’s suggestion that the Great Society suffered from “grievously 
insufficient personnel,” Goodrich insisted that “an increase in the personnel of experts” could 
never resolve the democratic dilemma.37 “Wallas’s phrase kept sticking oddly in my mind at 
the time when the Railway Strike of 1919 had England divided almost exactly into two camps,” 
Goodrich wrote, adding that “every industrial expert in the country was working either for the 
Railwaymen or in the government intelligence service,” and asking “how increasing the 
personnel in Whitehall on the one hand and at Unity House and in Eccleston Square on the 
other would have done anything to bring the Great Society together.”38 Mass society always 
involved various claims to expert authority, which amateur citizens had to negotiate somehow. 
                                                 
33 Goodrich to Lippmann, 10 July 1922. 
34 Goodrich, Frontier of Control, “Introduction: The Demand for Control.” 
35 Ibid., 36-8, at 37n35. Goodrich distinguished between “political” in “the wide sense” of authority relationships 
and in “the narrow sense of relating to the authority of the State of territorial unit.” He was interested in the former. 
36 See John Dewey, “Public Opinion,” New Republic, 3 May 1922, 286-8; and, for a strikingly similar criticism, 
Ernest Gruening, “Public Opinion and Democracy,” Nation, 26 July 1922, 97-8. 
37 Wallas, Great Society, 371; Goodrich to Lippmann, 10 July 1922. 
38 Goodrich to Lippmann, 10 July 1922. 
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“Is it your belief,” Goodrich asked Lippmann, “that these two (or three) phalanxes of experts 
would so lucidly state their cases that a just and amicable settlement would either appear clearly 
to both parties or be forced by an overwhelming sentiment of informed amateurs?” Lurking 
within Public Opinion Goodrich detected a theory of democratic debate “well ventilated by 
experts on both sides and open to the public of amateurs.”39  
 “I am delighted with your letter,” Lippmann wrote back, “for it goes to the center of 
the discussion.”40 Goodrich’s criticisms resonated with Lippmann because they engaged with 
his theoretical interests and textual influences to probe a problem at the center of his democratic 
theory: the political relationship between professional experts and democratic citizens. He 
asked to meet in New York to discuss this problem further, though Goodrich left for Amherst 
before receiving Lippmann’s reply, and their correspondence lapsed.41 But it shows that 
sophisticated approaches to the authority of experts, which drew directly on Public Opinion, 
were very much on Lippmann’s mind as the intelligence testing debate proceeded around him. 
Within weeks of replying to Goodrich, in fact, Lippmann started writing a long manuscript 
about the army tests, which centered on the psychological expertise behind them. “If the tests 
are sound,” he drafted, “if the conclusions usually drawn from them are true, a radical revision 
of the tenets of the democratic faith is inevitable.”42 When the New Republic published 
Lippmann’s manuscript over six consecutive issues from October, the series was the most 
sustained criticism of intelligence testing to appear outside a scholarly publication. 
 “A startling bit of news has recently been unearthed and is now being retailed by the 
credulous to the gullible,” Lippmann began. “‘The average mental age of Americans,’ says 
                                                 
39 Ibid.  
40 Walter Lippmann to Carter L. Goodrich, 14 July 1922, Lippmann Papers, Box 11, Folder 465. 
41 Carter L. Goodrich to Walter Lippmann, 2 Aug. 1922, Lippmann Papers, Box 11, Folder 465. 
42 Walter Lippmann, “The End of Democratic Optimism,” 7-9 Aug. 1922, 11, Lippmann Papers, Box 219, Folder 
308. Lippmann also cited Public Opinion to argue that democratic citizens struggled to comprehend “the very 
complex problems of the Great Society.” 
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Mr. Lothrop Stoddard in The Revolt Against Civilization, ‘is only about fourteen.’”43 For 
Stoddard, the army tests showed that America required neo-aristocratic government by 
intelligent individuals of high merit and the right race: the best should rule because the rest 
could not. Lippmann, however, did not take Stoddard’s politics seriously. Like many white 
liberals, Lippmann asserted agnostic scepticism on the issue of biological determinism, and, in 
general, disliked discussing race.44 Stoddard’s maniacal prophecies about “the downfall of 
civilization” also made it easy to dismiss him as “a propagandist.”45 What Lippmann focused 
on, very specifically, was Stoddard’s scientific credulity. “The trouble,” he stressed, “is that 
Mr. Stoddard uses the words ‘mental age’ without explaining either to himself or to his readers 
how the conception of ‘mental age’ is derived.”46 This conception, and the “scarifying 
statistics” it generated, had achieved widespread publicity as scientific knowledge. Beneath 
Stoddard’s “glittering tower of generalities,” then, Lippmann saw a more fundamental 
problem, less about the nature of intelligence than the authority of the expertise behind 
intelligence testing. “For the statement that the average mental age of Americans is only about 
fourteen,” he argued, “is not inaccurate. It is not incorrect. It is nonsense.”47  
This argument dramatized Goodrich’s dilemma, and led Lippmann to attack not 
Stoddard, but Terman. The audacity of this attack is worth emphasizing. Targeting Terman 
meant contesting the authority of an expert who had studied psychology for nearly two decades, 
earned the respect of his colleagues, and published substantial contributions to the discipline. 
Intelligence testing sat comfortably within functional and evolutionary approaches to 
psychology, fulfilled demands for experimental and applied methodologies, and expanded the 
                                                 
43 Walter Lippmann, “The Mental Age of Americans,” New Republic, 25 Oct. 1922, 212. Emphasis added for the 
title of Stoddard’s text, but the emphasis on “average” is in Stoddard, Revolt, 69. 
44 This had a complex relationship to his Jewishness: see Steel, Walter Lippmann, 186-96. 
45 Lippmann, “Mental Age,” 213, 215. 
46 Ibid., 213. 
47 Ibid. 
   12 
influence of the profession.48 By contrast, Lippmann was very much an amateur. As a Harvard 
undergraduate, he had studied with Hugo Münsterberg and Robert Yerkes, and cultivated a 
relationship with William James.49 Lippmann had also reviewed contemporary psychologists, 
and he read widely in social psychology, for this animated his political thinking.50 But he never 
trained professionally, and had no experience in psychometric testing. He was certainly not a 
scientist. However, by publicly contesting Terman’s scientific authority, Lippmann began to 
develop a politics of expertise through which amateurs could engage with experts.  
Much here turned, as Wallas had emphasized, on the “non-technical or half-technical 
terms by which the conclusions of the experts can be made clear to lay thinkers.”51 So 
Lippmann produced lively and aggressive articles, which sought to undermine Terman’s 
authority while assuring readers of their own scientific integrity. In them, Terman’s revision of 
the Binet-Simon scale seemed like a shabby affair, which, building on “a very weak 
foundation,” only worked by “editing, rearranging and supplementing the original Binet tests” 
so that Californian children could cope with tests designed for French children.52 Lippmann 
did not linger over the details of Terman’s revision, which included scale extensions, norm 
adjustments, and various other changes “in the scoring of a great many tests in order to make 
them fit better the locations assigned them.”53 Instead, Lippmann argued that the particularities 
of Binet’s original sample exposed serious limitations in Terman’s revision. “The aspect of all 
this which matters,” Lippmann told his readers, explaining the technicalities of the tests in 
carefully non-technical terms, “is that ‘mental age’ is simply the average performance with 
                                                 
48 Carson, Measure of Merit, 183-93; John M. O’Donnell, The Origins of Behaviorism: American Psychology, 
1870-1920 (New York, 1985), 230-40. 
49 Steel, Walter Lippmann, 12-22. James, of course, embraced an ambivalent professional identity: see Francesca 
Bordogna, William James at the Boundaries: Philosophy, Science, and the Geography of Knowledge (Chicago, 
2008). 
50 Walter Lippmann, “The Group Mind,” New Republic, 15 Dec. 1920, 82-6; Lippmann, “An Outline of 
Psychology,” New Republic, 22 Dec. 1920, 112-13; Lippmann, “The Behavior of Crowds,” 2 Mar. 1921, 22-4.  
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certain rather arbitrary problems. The thing to keep in mind,” he reiterated, returning to the 
political debate, “is that all the talk about ‘a mental age of fourteen’ goes back to the 
performance of eighty-two California school children in 1913-14.”54  
 This was on target, more or less. Terman had actually tested “approximately 1000 
children,” but Californian children provided a poor basis for norming the test scores of adult 
army recruits, and no basis for evaluating Americans in general.55 Psychologists debated 
different methods of constructing psychometric norms during the war, and the issue has been 
much discussed since.56 But rather than probing these problems in depth, Lippmann turned in 
his second article to the time limits under which the army administered the tests. Here he 
claimed that those who were able to complete the tests quickly were measured as more 
intelligent, such that the army could have classified more people as more intelligent “by 
lengthening the time” for testing.57 For Lippmann, then, the unscientific nature of intelligence 
testing was shown not only by Terman’s revision of Binet’s scale, but also by the army’s 
administration of the subsequent tests. More than this, though, Lippmann argued that no 
psychologist possessed the expertise to isolate or measure intelligence as an innate construct. 
He allowed that testing might usefully measure some capacities in specific contexts, but 
announced that intelligence itself was “an exceedingly complicated notion which nobody has 
as yet succeeded in defining.”58  
So the idea that intelligence testing could either identify Stoddard’s neo-aristocracy or 
sustain a ruling expert elite seemed absurd. Indeed, Lippmann joked that if the tests were true 
then professors of psychology “would soon occupy a position which no intellectual has held 
since the collapse of theocracy…. what a future to dream about!”59 Rather, the problem the 
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tests presented to Lippmann lay in the scientific authority they afforded to anti-democratic 
opinion, because this presented amateur citizens with the need to engage with and control 
professional experts. “When we see how men like Stoddard and McDougall have exploited the 
army tests,” Lippmann stressed, “we realize how necessary, but how unheeded, is the warning 
of  Messrs. Yoakum and Yerkes that ‘the ease with which the army group tests can be given 
and scored makes it a dangerous method in the hands of the inexpert.’”60 The danger for 
democracy was the difficulty of knowing which experts to trust, for while Yoakum and Yerkes 
seemed sensible on this point, they also produced expertise with contested political 
consequences. By making Terman’s expertise seem unscientific to democratic citizens, 
however, Lippmann modelled a politics of expertise that controlled expert authority through 
public controversies that shaped amateur opinion.  
This politics relied on effective rhetorical strategies for making expertise accessible, 
which Lippmann’s literary facility and journalistic dexterity made possible. But his amateurism 
in psychology also risked error, and, unsurprisingly, he made some dodgy claims about the 
tests. For instance, the army had used two main tests to measure intelligence: “Army a,” which 
used a scale developed by Yerkes (similar but not identical to Terman’s Stanford-Binet scale) 
to test around 4,000 people; and “Army Alpha,” which used a scale whose results were more 
closely correlated with the Stanford-Binet to test around 1,700,000 people.61 But Lippmann 
wrote that the army “did not use the Binet system,” and baldly added that it “scored by a system 
of points which we need not stop to describe.” He then argued that the army results contradicted 
the Stanford-Binet scale by producing different measures of adult intelligence, and concluded 
that the army tests “knocked the Stanford-Binet measure of adult intelligence into a cocked 
hat.”62 This sounded good, but the substance of Lippmann’s argument here was that the army 
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tests both proved Terman’s (already flawed) Stanford-Binet scale wrong, while also being 
wrong in themselves. This created cognitive dissonance, and overlooked two stubborn facts: 
first, that the army tests had actually used very similar techniques to “the Binet system,” 
because they had been broadly based on Terman’s revision of that system; and, second, that 
Terman himself had helped further revise this system for the army. So nothing was knocked 
into a cocked hat.  
Beyond these blunders, Lippmann ignored areas of agreement with Terman in his later 
articles. For example, he outlined “the positive value of the tests,” and argued that they could 
improve the administration of democratic education. Though the Stanford-Binet scale did not 
measure intelligence as an innate construct, Lippmann conceded that it correlated reasonably 
well “with the quality of school work, with school grades and with school progress.” So, “if 
you have to classify children for the convenience of school administration, you are more likely 
to get a more coherent classification with the tests than without them.”63 This position, 
however, put Lippmann close to Terman. For years Terman had in fact chaired a subcommittee 
of the National Education Association on the “Use of Intelligence Tests in Revision of 
Elementary Education,” which in 1922 published a report about how testing could improve the 
administration of democratic education.64 Lippmann thus agreed with Terman in a major public 
debate on a specific way in which science could improve education policy for democracy, but 
spoke loudly and furiously past him. In this controversy “scientific democracy” strained, for 
political hostility eclipsed intellectual proximity. 
Indeed, Lippmann’s final article almost called Terman a fraud. “The chief intelligence 
testers, led by Professor Terman” had revealed themselves not only as pseudo-scientists, but 
ultimately as self-interested elites pursuing “the will to power.” Terman’s expertise, Lippmann 
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concluded, had no authority as science. “The claim that Mr. Terman or anyone else is 
measuring hereditary intelligence has no more scientific foundation than a hundred other fads, 
vitamins and glands and amateur psychoanalysis and correspondence courses in will power,” 
he wrote, “and it will pass with them into that limbo where phrenology and palmistry and 
characterology and the other Babu sciences are to be found.”65 Lippmann articles, then, 
amounted to a rhetorically effective attack on a professional expert by an amateur critic, which 
was partly accurate and partly unfair, but which most of all was very public. It developed 
Goodrich’s demand that Lippmann think more about the political relationship between 
democracy and expertise, and suggested some difficulties in making the politics of expertise 
democratic. For though Lippmann might convince non-experts, he had stumbled with the 
science and avoided consensus with Terman. But before the expert himself responded, another 
intervention occurred.  
 
II 
 
“I agree with Mr. Lippmann’s conclusions,” wrote John Dewey to Herbert Croly, the editor of 
the New Republic. Dewey’s agreement extended to writing two articles, which pre-emptively 
defended Lippmann from Terman, and which made broader arguments about the relationship 
between democracy and expertise. Dewey was more conscious than Lippmann that he was “not 
an expert in this field,” and so sought advice from his daughter Evelyn, “who had worked 
practically on the tests for three years, and who also agreed. She made some suggestions which 
I have embodied…. so that the ‘experts’ might not come back and accuse Mr L of ignorance 
or misrepresentation.”66 Croly told Lippmann that Dewey’s articles were “extremely valuable, 
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and almost as badly written as they are valuable.”67 The New Republic printed them in the two 
issues following Lippmann’s series. 
“As Mr. Lippmann has so clearly shown in these pages,” Dewey argued, the claim that 
the average mental age of Americans could be identified as about thirteen was “literally 
senseless.”68 Dewey already saw intelligence not as an innate construct but in terms of the 
relationship between individual habit and social environment, so he readily agreed with 
Lippmann’s argument that intelligence testing was not science and that the testers were not 
scientists.69 But the tests did more than question Dewey’s understanding of intelligence; they 
also troubled his broader account of the relationship between democracy and education. Dewey 
had long argued that “democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of 
associated living,” and had long seen education in “scientific method” as essential for this 
mode.70 Moreover, his argument built on a distinctive philosophical system, which, by 
combining a naturalistic (anti-metaphysical) epistemology with a consequentialist 
(instrumental) ethics, saw science and democracy as mutually constitutive activities.71 Dewey 
had always urged experts to educate broader publics by popularizing scientific knowledge, and 
attacked attempts to limit scientific education, such as William Jennings Bryan’s 
contemporaneous campaign against teaching evolutionary biology in public schools.72 But 
while Bryan’s campaign represented a form of anti-scientific democracy, which could be 
combatted through better education about evolution, Terman’s tests presented Dewey with a 
potentially more worrying proposition: anti-democratic science. 
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Beyond embracing Lippmann’s argument that intelligence testing was unscientific, 
Dewey therefore explained its political implications through the education of the experts 
themselves. “There is no need to re-traverse the ground so admirably covered by Mr. 
Lippmann,” he wrote. “But why has it been so general assumed among our cultivated leaders 
that a purely classificatory formula gives information about individual intelligence in its 
individuality?”73 This focus on “the acquired habits of intellectual spokesmen” rather than “the 
inherent intellectuality of the populace” made sense, for it meant that Dewey could attack the 
experts without conceding the possibility that their expertise might be true. Building on 
Lippmann’s conclusion that the intelligence testers concealed an elitist will to power, Dewey 
indicted a broader intellectual elite that the testers represented and preserved. “The inference 
to be drawn from the popular reception of mental testings…. shows how their education, that 
given by their surroundings as well as by their schools,” Dewey argued, “has fixed in them the 
disposition to judge by classification instead of by discrimination, and by classifications which 
represent the average of massed members, mediocrities instead of individualities.”74 For 
Dewey, intelligence testing threatened democracy not because it was scientific knowledge, but 
because the testers themselves had not been educated democratically. The authority of their 
expertise thus reaffirmed Dewey’s broader claim (expressed in his review of Public Opinion 
and many other places) that democracy depended on “fundamental general education.”75 He 
insisted that “until we have tried the educational experiment, we simply do not know and shall 
not know what individual capacities and limits really are.”76  
Dewey’s second article expanded on these individual capacities and their relationship 
to democracy. “It was once supposed, at least by some, that the purpose of education… was to 
discover and release individualized capacities,” he wrote. Yet now, he added, “we welcome a 
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procedure which under the title of science… assigns [the individual] to a predestined niche and 
thereby does whatever education can do to perpetuate the present order.” Dewey then 
emphasized that “the irony of the situation is that this course is usually taken in the name of 
aristocracy, even of intellectual aristocracy, and as part of an attack upon the tendencies of 
democracy to ignore individuality.” Drawing on his broader theoretical commitments, he went 
on to argue that democracy actually implied “faith in individuality, in uniquely distinctive 
qualities in each normal human being; faith in corresponding unique modes of activity that 
create new ends, with willing acceptance of the modifications of the established order entailed 
by the release of individualized capacities.” By ignoring individuality and damaging education, 
the intelligence testers denied democracy’s “basic moral and ideal meaning.” For Dewey, ideal 
democracy meant a form of associated living in which morally equal individuals realized their 
uniquely individualized capacities through scientific education and public deliberation. 
“Democracy in this sense,” he wrote, “denotes, one may say, aristocracy carried to its limit.”77 
Dewey’s argument that true democracy meant universal aristocracy challenged the 
whole distinction between professional experts and amateur citizens. In Dewey’s democracy, 
“every human being as an individual may be the best for some particular purpose and hence be 
the most fitted to rule, to lead, in that specific respect.” When fundamental general education 
had released each individual’s individuality, there would be no distinction between “superior” 
and “inferior” individuals, but rather an equality of superiorities. Because science would be the 
domain of everyone, and because deliberation would be continuous, all the citizens would in 
some respect be experts. “Democracy will not be democracy until education makes it its chief 
concern to release distinctive aptitudes in art, thought and companionship,” Dewey reiterated. 
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He concluded that “the democrat with his faith in moral equality is the representative of 
aristocracy made universal.”78 
It has been observed that Dewey’s democratic theory struggles to account for political 
reality and tends to rely on moral exhortation.79 But the Lippmann-Terman controversy 
provides a particularly striking case study in the consequences of Dewey’s politics. For here 
he intervened in a live public debate about some scientific expertise that had dire implications 
for his vision of democracy, and he argued that there was no ultimate conflict between 
democracy and expertise. After embracing Lippmann’s critique and endorsing his attempt to 
make the politics of expertise democratic, Dewey explored the defective education of the 
intelligence testers and suggested that real education could eventually make democracy expert. 
Where Lippmann saw an urgent political problem in Terman’s expertise, Dewey saw an 
ultimately pedagogical problem. He struggled to explain how democracy and expertise could 
engage with each other politically, because he saw true democracy as universal aristocracy, 
and universal aristocracy had no need for a politics of expertise. This argument, however, had 
little traction in a controversy about the political relationship between democracy and expertise, 
and neither Lippmann nor Terman felt compelled to engage with it. 
 
III 
 
Colleagues reported that Terman “trembled with rage” after reading Lippmann’s articles.80 
Having led disciplinary efforts to define professional standards and influence public policy, 
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and having happily debated fellow scholars (like Bagley) in academic journals, Terman found 
amateur attacks on his expertise politically damaging and intellectually insulting.81 Forced to 
defend his authority in public, Terman responded with a long and angry article in the New 
Republic, which argued that a critic like Lippmann could have no standing against the 
“majority of the psychologists of America, England and Germany” who supported intelligence 
testing. Terman focused first on Lippmann’s vulnerable claim that the army tests contradicted 
the Stanford-Binet scale, and explained that Lippmann had not accounted for the different 
points systems used by the army, nor for their similarities to the Stanford-Binet scale, nor for 
the fact that “independent age norms have several times been derived for the army tests by 
applying them to large groups of unselected school children. I have presented some of these 
norms,” he added, invoking his own expertise while revoking Lippmann’s claims on it, “in the 
very report from which Mr. Lippmann quotes a few of the facts he is unable to interpret.” 
Similarly, Terman contested Lippmann’s claim that time limits determined test scores by 
observing that this issue had also been “thoroughly investigated.”82 And, indeed, the experts 
had found that changing time limits did “not result in any demonstrable improvement” in test 
scores.83  
 More broadly, Terman accused Lippmann of bad faith in his use of psychological 
expertise. For instance, Lippmann had suggested that the British eugenicist Francis Galton and 
the American psychologist James McKeen Cattell disagreed about whether or not intelligence 
was hereditary, and then had used this suggestion to argue that the hereditary nature of human 
intelligence was not a scientific consensus.84 But Terman argued that Lippmann’s suggestion 
was dishonest. “Note how cleverly Mr. Lippmann strives for effect by playing off one 
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psychologist against another,” Terman wrote. “The trick is very simple; all you do is to take an 
isolated statement out of its original setting and quote it in a setting made to order. In that way 
you can have all the expert opinion on your side.” Because Lippmann’s criticism did depend 
on deploying scientists strategically to generate rhetorical authority, this had some bite. “Mr. 
Bryan,” Terman added, “is said to use this method with telling effect against the evolutionists.” 
Terman then warned that “when the outsider comes along” and tried to exploit legitimate 
disagreements among professional scientists, “it is well to be on one’s guard. In ninety-nine 
cases out of a hundred it means that an unfair advantage is being taken both of the reader and 
of the author quoted.”85 Because amateurs like Lippmann or Bryan could manipulate their 
publics, what mattered politically was the protection of autonomous space for the professionals. 
Terman’s politics of expertise was therefore about removing politics from expertise. Science 
was for scientists, and democracy happened after or elsewhere. 
 In the context of Lippmann’s claims about Galton and Cattell, however, Terman’s 
argument depended on showing that all the experts agreed that intelligence was hereditary. And 
here Terman could only use his own rhetorical strategies to try to persuade public opinion that 
the science was on his side. “Think,” he urged, “of Mr. Lippmann’s quoting Cattell in support 
of his tirade against intelligence testing.” The thought was ridiculous: “Cattell, the pupil of 
Galton, the father of mentality testing in America, the inventor of new methods for the study 
of individual differences, the author of important studies (in progress) on the inheritance of 
genius!”86 Yet, striving for effect, Terman strained against both the history of intelligence 
testing and his own intellectual biography. For, substantively, Cattell had neither followed 
Galton nor fathered American intelligence testing. Rather, Cattell’s early Comtean sympathies 
meant that Galton’s statistical positivism would always have been attractive (especially after 
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training with Wilhelm Wundt).87 And though Cattell’s 1890 article on “Mental Tests and 
Measurements” generated some enthusiasm among American psychologists, this was 
unsurprising in the broader context of the empirically-orientated “new psychology,” and his 
influence had mostly died by 1900.88 Terman knew and respected Cattell, but did not engage 
much with his work.89 Indeed, Cattell told Terman that his response to Lippmann had 
exaggerated the scientific consensus about the hereditary nature of human intelligence.90 “I am 
quite aware that you probably attribute somewhat less to native endowment than I do,” Terman 
replied, “but I did not feel that Lippmann was justified in quoting you in a way to leave the 
impression that you attributed next to nothing to endowment.”91 
 Terman’s own use of experts for effect thus reinforced Lippmann’s position: amateur 
publics struggled to evaluate expertise in its own terms, but they could and would engage with 
the authority of experts in some terms. The political contest was over which terms, and here 
much turned on matters of rhetoric and tone. For what contemporaries responding to the 
controversy cared about most was not what Terman said, but the manner in which he said it. 
“Professor Terman, if animated by the scientific spirit,” complained one correspondent in the 
New Republic, “would have stated fairly, clearly, frankly and with a minimum of jargon his 
assumptions; these and the deductions drawn from the application of these assumptions are the 
questions at issue on which ironic invective throws little light.”92 Another objected that the 
controversy had descended into “a clash of wits,” and observed that intelligence testing “is 
becoming the table-talk of countless school teachers and social workers, who in their local way 
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can and perhaps are doing much damage by the application of unripe theories.”93 Because 
Terman sounded more like a polemicist promoting table-talk than a scientist probing the 
evidence, he struggled to achieve authority for his expertise. Lippmann could get away with 
ad hominem attacks, for journalism rewarded sharp sentences about the hidden interests of 
one’s opponent. But scientific authority demanded a more measured manner, which stuck to 
substance of the arguments at stake.  
 Terman’s decision to abandon this rhetoric generated especially acute anxieties among 
academics. “I think you make a mistake to adopt the sarcastic attitude,” warned Howard 
Warren, a Princeton psychologist. “That attitude still goes in politics and the drama, but I 
believe that scientists ought to eschew it even in replying to a Bryan.”94 From Chicago, the 
political scientist Charles Merriam likewise fretted “that there should be so much odium 
philosophicum in the discussion of a coldly scientific situation” in a letter to Robert Yerkes.95 
The controversy put Yerkes in a particularly difficult position, however, for he had both worked 
with Terman on the army tests and taught Lippmann at Harvard. He first rebuked Lippmann 
for not doing justice to “the science of mental measurement,” and regretted that if “you had 
had a better psychological background… your contribution might have been more largely 
constructive.”96 But he then told Terman that “the layman” would not understand so flippant a 
response to Lippmann: “I found myself doubting whether the average reader would not mistake 
playfulness (humor, sarcasm, irony and other things) for a species of psychological 
seriousness.”97 Terman’s tone troubled academics because many shared his belief in the 
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intellectual authority of autonomous scientific research, but worried about the journalistic 
rhetoric on which this authority depended in public. To them the controversy suggested that 
responding effectively to amateur attacks on professional expertise meant responding with the 
sobriety and specificity that could reinforce the cultural authority of scientific autonomy. It 
suggested, in other words, that the authority of scientific expertise in a democracy depended 
less of the intellectual content of the science than on the rhetorical credibility of the scientist. 
 So when Lippmann replied to Terman’s response by emphasizing its lack of “scientific 
temper,” Terman had nowhere left to go.98 His now-nervous publishers told him that, although 
that Lippmann was “dead wrong,” any continuation of the controversy would “lower the 
dignity of the psychological profession,” and that the best strategy was to “withdraw with as 
few words as possible.”99 This Terman did, in a short letter of six sentences.100 Lippmann 
cheerfully responded again, in a longer letter that declared victory.101 Two months later, 
Terman glumly told an old graduate student that “answers in the future will be confined to the 
presentation of data in scientific journals. There is no use trying to argue with some people.”102 
By forcefully and repeatedly claiming that Terman was not a scientist, and with the help of 
Terman’s furious responses to these claims, Lippmann had publicly and convincingly contested 
the authority of the expertise behind intelligence testing.  
As a broader political model, however, Lippmann’s position involved difficulties. He 
had shown how professional expertise could be made accessible to an amateur public through 
an effective rhetoric that gave the right sort of authority to the right sort of expert, but these 
variables did not align easily in the actually existing culture of American democracy. There 
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was no guarantee, for instance, that major rhetoricians would be good democrats who listened 
to the professionals: witness Mencken. But nor was there a guarantee that major “scientific 
democrats” would be good rhetoricians: witness Dewey. And unscientific democrats could still 
captivate publics through oratory, as Bryan would demonstrate two years later at the Scopes 
trial. Moreover, Lippmann had relied on a journalistic rhetoric to make expertise democratic, 
but this allowed him to evade the scrutiny that more professional registers made possible. The 
scope of his public was also unclear: Lippmann wrote for a general reader, but the actual 
audience of the New Republic was fairly elite.103 He sought to make expertise accessible 
through journalism, but did not specify how other institutions, like schools or unions, might 
productively engage with the press. 
Most importantly, professional scientists continued to develop intelligence testing’s 
intellectual sophistication, ideological force, and institutional reach. In the New Republic in 
June 1923, the Harvard psychologist Edwin Boring published his influential argument that 
“intelligence is what the tests test,” which carefully deflated many of Lippmann’s criticisms.104 
In an early account of what came to be known as “operationism” in psychology, Boring argued 
that intelligence was not an individually innate construct (like “mental age”), but an 
operationally observable concept.105 Drawing an analogy with the concept of power in physics, 
he claimed that intelligence testing tested intelligence as “the amount of work that can be done 
in a given time.” And this, he pressed, collapsed Lippmann’s contention that time limits 
undermined a unitary concept of intelligence, because if “intelligence is like power, this 
contention is not an argument. If these people have less power, they have to go up the hill on 
low gear and it takes them longer; that is all.”106 Boring did not mention Lippmann explicitly, 
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but implicitly offered a more convincing response to him than Terman. Like Terman, Boring 
prized scientific autonomy and mostly thought that expertise was for experts.107 But he made 
his case through epistemology, not irony, and he took care to sound scientific. “Only with more 
observation and less inference,” Boring concluded, could more be said about intelligence.108  
Professional objections to Terman’s public sarcasm did not harm his career, for he 
assumed the presidency of the American Psychological Association in 1923. In his presidential 
address, Terman confidently announced that intelligence testing had “broadened and 
intensified our incentives to research, enlarged the public support of our science, and attracted 
new hosts of workers to the psychological vineyard.”109 By the end of the 1920s, his scales for 
testing children in primary and secondary education had annual sales in the hundreds of 
thousands.110 Also at this time, psychometric testing expanded into many other areas, including 
the scientific study of gifted children, the coerced sterilization of the “feebleminded” adults, 
the racialized restriction of immigration from particular nations, the internment of criminals, 
the detection of delinquency, the analysis of sexuality, and the administration of industry.111  
By the late 1940s, Boring wrote, “there was so much testing and it was working well.”112 So 
when cognitive psychologists during the Cold War argued that testing personalities for 
authoritarian tendencies could enhance democracy, they were untroubled by an old controversy 
about measuring intelligence.113 And when critics of intelligence testing in the 1970s sought to 
revive Lippmann for “an unfinished chapter in the history of psychology,” the effort 
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miscarried, for he had nothing new to add to the nature-nurture controversy.114 And at a broader 
level, New Left critiques of psychological expertise had little room for Lippmann. Noam 
Chomsky, for instance, became an influential critic of both behavioral psychology and 
Lippmann’s democratic theory as ideologies of technocratic elitism.115  
 Lippmann continued to criticize intelligence testing as 1923 wore on, but became 
repetitive. He published another, shorter series of articles in the New Republic, which centered 
on the British psychologist Cyril Burt as “one of the great authorities” on intelligence testing, 
who had superior expertise to “the more breathless work of the better known American 
testers.”116 But Burt did not differ much from Terman, for both saw intelligence as scientifically 
measurable, significantly hereditary, and politically consequential.117 Lippmann’s use of Burt’s 
authority to suggest Terman’s breathlessness simply reiterated the difficulties of making 
amateurs engage with experts. Terman himself stayed silent, but William McDougall (Burt’s 
old Oxford tutor) waded in as “a man of science” to insist that experts had a duty to publish 
their opinion “no matter how distasteful it may be.”118 Lippmann replied to McDougall by 
restating the dilemma that Terman had dramatized: “when a man of science comes along, 
claims to speak as a biologist and a scientific psychologist, and offers doubtful political theories 
as scientific judgments, the protection of genuine scepticism is denied us.”119  
 
IV 
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Lippmann began making notes for another work of democratic theory in March 1923, just after 
finishing his controversy with Terman.120 He completed a draft in August, which he soon titled 
Live and Let Live.121 The text went through several revisions before being published two years 
later as The Phantom Public (not least in terms of its title, which for a while was simply 
Democracy).122 It returned to the dilemma of democracy in the Great Society, and is usually 
read as a sequel to Public Opinion, shorter and starker in style, perhaps, but basically similar 
in substance.123 Here, however, it will be suggested that important aspects of Lippmann’s 
argument in The Phantom Public developed the themes of the intelligence testing controversy. 
For this text did not make the case, as Public Opinion had done in the end, for integrating 
experts into the bureaucracy of the administrative state. Instead, Lippmann devoted much of 
The Phantom Public to exploring the nature of democratic debate, and to asking how 
democratic publics might make political decisions about issues for which they lack expertise. 
Indeed, the text can be read as a minimal but constructive account of how amateurs control 
experts through public controversies. 
 There are obvious resonances of Public Opinion in The Phantom Public, for both texts 
address connected questions and are products of the same sensibility. Lippmann still saw the 
omnicompetent citizen as an “unattainable ideal,” despite, he now added, the claims of 
“Lothrop Stoddard and other revivalists” that such a figure could be bred.124 The Phantom 
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Public also repeated earlier arguments against the liberal constitutionalist approaches to public 
opinion associated with James Bryce, and placed itself firmly in the context of what Lippmann 
called “the disenchantment of democracy.”125 But crucially, where he had earlier moved from 
these positions to emphasizing the need for more expertise in government, he now explored 
why and how expert authority created political problems for democracy. As Lippmann wrote 
in an early draft, “there is no automatic virtue in the fact finding agency. It is neither fool-proof 
nor knave-proof, and worst of all, from the point of view of democracy, its conclusions are 
rarely interesting.”126 In the published text, he argued that this “popular boredom and contempt 
for the expert” could make the authority of expertise frail in democracies, even as it remained 
an inevitable aspect of the Great Society. “The organization of intelligence to administer 
modern affairs would probably be entirely neglected,” Lippmann wrote, “were it not that 
departments of government, corporations, trade unions and trade associations are being 
compelled by their own internal necessities of administration, and by compulsion of other 
corporate groups, to record their own acts, measure them, publish them and stand accountable 
for them.”127  
The Phantom Public did not claim that democracy could somehow consign politics to 
a general class of elite experts. Precisely because of the Great Society’s complex variety, no 
such class existed. Different political problems involved different groups of “insiders” and 
“outsiders,” depending on the interests and opinions involved, but Lippmann thought that those 
who saw “a congenital difference between the masterful few and the ignorant many” were 
“victims of a superficial analysis.”128 The pluralism of the Great Society was so deep, and the 
specialization of knowledge so great, that insiders with expertise in one area of modern 
democracy would always be amateur outsiders in others. “That is why,” Lippmann argued, 
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“excellent automobile manufacturers, literary critics and scientists often talk such nonsense 
about politics.”129 Henry Ford had expertise in industrial production, Mencken knew much 
about novels, and certain psychologists (probably Burt rather than Terman) might even be able 
to measure particular traits. But Ford could not evaluate psychology scientifically, Mencken 
could not mass produce cars, and Burt could not appraise literature: no one could comprehend, 
let alone direct, the complexity of the Great Society’s politics. The challenge for democratic 
theory, then, was to explain how amateur outsiders could engage with the expertise necessary 
to address an always evolving range of intricate political problems. “We are forced to ask,” 
Lippmann wrote, “whether it is possible for men to find a way of acting effectively upon highly 
complex affairs by very simple means.”130  
He answered that it was possible, and produced an austere analysis of “what the public 
does.”131 In this, Lippmann argued that groups of citizens became publics at specific moments 
to address particular political problems by observing and intervening in public controversies. 
He did not think that these publics could generate the expertise necessary “to deal with the 
substance of a problem,” but he did argue that “the ideal of public opinion is to align men 
during the crisis of a problem in such a way as to favor the action of those individuals who may 
be able to compose the crisis.”132 This “ideal” did not solve political problems through public 
reason, but it did provide a way for democratic publics to engage with and make judgments 
about those who claimed the authority to solve them. In an echo of the intelligence testing 
controversy, Lippmann argued that amateur citizens could not understand the technical content 
of expertise, but that they could and should control the experts. “They must judge externally,” 
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he wrote, “and they can act only by supporting one of the interests directly involved.”133 
Moreover, their judgments depended on the external signs by which those who stood on the 
side of the public interest in a particular controversy could be perceived. “The power to discern 
those individuals,” he stressed, “is the end of the effort to educate public opinion. The aim of 
research designed to facilitate public action is the discovery of clear signs by which these 
individuals may be discerned.”134 These signs were not stereotypes for manufacturing consent, 
but rhetorical representations to help ordinary citizens make political judgments about 
particular insiders, which further echoed Lippmann’s earlier strategy for making psychological 
expertise accessible to amateurs. “The signs are relevant,” he continued, “when they reveal by 
coarse, simple and objective tests which side in a controversy upholds a workable social rule, 
or which is attacking an unworkable rule, or which proposes a promising new rule.”135 
Lippmann expanded on these social rules in the second half of The Phantom Public. 
“The interest of the public,” he wrote, “is not in the rules and contracts and customs themselves 
but in the maintenance of a régime of rule, contract and custom.” This amounted to something 
like a system of democratic norms, “some system of rights and duties” that maintained the 
culture through which democracy functioned.136 Public controversies represented breaches of 
this culture, which turned on intricate issues that most amateur outsiders could not understand, 
but which could also involve representational schemes through which external judgments about 
expert insiders might be made. To aid citizens in their navigation of these controversies, 
Lippmann also established various “tests” that could be applied in them.137 For example, when 
someone contested a social rule while relying on the authority of someone else whose assent 
was lacking (or whose conformity was absent), the contested rule could be assumed to serve 
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their self-interest, and the public could proceed to choose another person to fix it.138 
Lippmann’s tests tried to be specific, but also exposed gaps in his argument. He did not, for 
instance, detail the actual political procedures by which publics aligned themselves with 
particular insiders. Nor did he provide guidance on how to resolve social rules that were broken 
unjustly but without objection. Nor did he explain what to do if debate broke down and a 
minority found itself at the mercy of a tyrannical majority. 
 But The Phantom Public nonetheless argued that democracy was a political order in 
which amateur outsiders exerted controlling authority over expert insiders. Even as Lippmann 
chronicled the complexity of mass society, even as he emphasized the illusions of public 
opinion, and even as he detailed the deficiencies of the citizens, he also maintained that “the 
bystander’s only recourse is to insist upon debate.”139 Through public controversies, a 
democratic citizen could constructively shape politics. “He will not be able, we may assume, 
to judge the merits of arguments,” Lippmann reiterated. “But if he does insist upon full freedom 
of discussion, the advocates are very likely to expose one another. Open debate… will tend to 
betray the partisan and the advocate.”140 The Phantom Public, then, presented public 
controversies as the agonistic locus of democratic politics, where partisanship could be 
perceived, advocacy betrayed, social rules contested, and expertise eschewed or embraced. 
Controversies were not deliberative spaces for rational discussion among all the citizens, but 
political arenas in which claims to authority competed for the attention and loyalty of particular 
publics through symbolic representations of the issues at stake. Through them, Lippmann 
argued that public opinion in its “highest ideal” would “defend those who are prepared to act 
on their reason against the interrupting force of those who merely assert their will.”141 
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 During the intelligence testing controversy, Lippmann had assumed precisely this role 
of an individual prepared to act reasonably, and directly accused Terman of merely asserting a 
will to power. He had doubted that amateur citizens could understand the intricacies of the tests 
themselves, and so contested the authority of the expertise behind them through rhetorical 
strategies that represented them as unscientific before a broader public. In the cut-and-thrust of 
democratic debate, Lippmann had developed ideas about the politics of expertise that made 
their way into his democratic theory. For in The Phantom Public he explained, minimally but 
constructively, how amateur citizens might direct democratic politics through public 
controversies that turned on the authority of experts. Read in the context of the Lippmann-
Terman controversy, The Phantom Public seems less like a sequel to than a revision of Public 
Opinion. The texts share many premises and a disenchanted sensibility, but the substance of 
their arguments differ. Lippmann had earlier emphasized the need for expertise in democratic 
government and more broadly explored the social psychology of democratic citizenship, but 
now he sought to understand the real politics of democratic debate. Moreover, Public Opinion’s 
conceptual vocabulary does little work in The Phantom Public (“stereotypes” appear only 
glancingly; “pseudo-environments” are absent), and Lippmann develops other arguments 
about “rules” and “tests” in public controversies. After Terman, Lippmann’s democratic theory 
focused on how public opinion could function through controversy “so that men, driven to 
make terms, may live and let live.”142 
“Hence, while one might cite passages which, if divorced from their context, would 
give the impression that Mr. Lippmann was permanently ‘off’ democracy,” wrote Dewey in an 
admiring review of the text, “Mr. Lippmann’s essay is in reality a statement of faith in a pruned 
and temperate democratic theory, and a presentation of methods by which a reasonable 
conception of democracy can be made to work, not absolutely, but at least better than 
                                                 
142 Ibid., 74. 
   35 
democracy works under an exaggerated and undisciplined notion of the public and its powers.” 
Dewey added that, “to my mind at least, his contribution is constructive.”143 Two years later 
Dewey published The Public and Its Problems, and included in this classic work a much-
discussed engagement with Lippmann. Given the generally binary nature of this discussion, it 
is worth recalling that the first half of Dewey’s text consists of a consequentialist theory of the 
pluralist state, which drew on his much older ambivalence about juristic accounts of 
sovereignty.144 This is not the place to explore these chapters, but rather to emphasize that The 
Public and Its Problems contains complex arguments about various subjects, to some of which 
Lippmann is liminal. Not until a footnote in the fourth chapter does Dewey signal his 
“indebtedness” to Public Opinion and The Phantom Public, “not only as to this particular point 
[that ‘the Public seems to be lost; it is certainly bewildered’], but for ideas involved in my 
entire discussion even when it reaches conclusions diverging from [Lippmann].”145 And, as 
this acknowledgement suggests, Dewey saw his engagement with Lippmann as more of a 
dialogue than a refutation.146 In the second half of The Public and Its Problems, Dewey thus 
explored how “the Great Society” might be transformed into what he called “a Great 
Community.”147 
Part of this transformation concerned “the relation of experts to a democratic public,” 
which Dewey considered most fully in his final chapter.148 Here he did not discuss Lippmann 
explicitly, but he did invoke the intelligence testing controversy. “Effective intelligence is not 
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an original, innate endowment,” Dewey wrote. “No matter what are the differences in native 
intelligence (allowing for the moment that intelligence can be native), the actuality of mind is 
dependent upon the education which social conditions effect.”149 As Lippmann had argued and 
Dewey had agreed, those who claimed the expertise to measure native intelligence actually 
threatened democracy by giving authority to pseudo-science. Dewey insisted that fundamental 
general education was still the issue. “A more intelligent state of social affairs, one more 
informed with knowledge, more directed by intelligence, would not improve original 
endowments one whit, but it would raise the level upon which the intelligence of all operates,” 
he reiterated. “The height of this level is much more important for judgment of public concerns 
than are differences in intelligence quotients.”150 Indeed, when it came to the relationship 
between democracy and expertise more generally, Dewey insisted that “the problem of the 
public” was “the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and 
persuasion.”151  
In the context of the Lippmann-Terman controversy, Dewey’s argument here is best 
understood as an agreement with Lippmann. For the methods and conditions of debate, 
discussion, and persuasion had defined Lippmann’s engagement with Terman and shaped his 
theoretical agenda in The Phantom Public. Though Lippmann’s account of democratic debate 
was more agonistic, and Dewey’s was more deliberative, both sought to explain how 
democracy could engage with and control the authority of expertise. The Public and Its 
Problems agreed with Lippmann that this authority was inevitable in mass society, and also 
approved of attempts to make expertise democratic through public debates. “It is not necessary 
that the many should have the knowledge and skill to carry on the needed [expert] 
investigations,” Dewey wrote; “what is required is that they have the ability to judge of the 
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bearing of the knowledge supplied by others upon common concerns.”152 This, in fact, came 
close to articulating Lippmann’s position on intelligence testing: democratic citizens did not 
have to understand the technical content of scientific expertise, but they did need to judge “the 
bearing of the knowledge” through discussion and persuasion. However, Dewey also held on 
to the hope that scientific education and public deliberation would one day make democracy 
expert. “Just as the specialized mind and knowledge of the past is embodied in implements, 
utensils, devices and technologies which those of a grade of intelligence which could not 
produce them can now intelligently use,” he claimed, “so it will be when currents of public 
knowledge blow through social affairs.”153 
Dewey concluded that only local community could realize true democracy. This 
conclusion involved the familiar difficulties of Dewey’s politics, for he did not explain how to 
sustain such a community under modern conditions, and effectively abandoned the broader 
analysis of how the Great Society could become a Great Community.154 “It is outside the scope 
of our discussion to look into the prospects of the reconstruction of face-to-face communities,” 
he stated.155 But, Dewey nonetheless insisted, in a local community the immediacy and energy 
of face-to-face communication would release and expand the unique capacities of every 
individual beyond anything the intelligence testers had imagined. “There is no limit to the 
liberal expansion and confirmation of limited personal intellectual endowment which may 
proceed from the flow of social intelligence when that circulates by word of mouth from one 
to another in the communications of the local community,” said Dewey. “That and that only 
gives reality to public opinion.”156 So, pace Lippmann and contra Terman, Dewey argued that 
local and vocal rather than mass and visual communication could deliberatively generate 
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“social intelligence.” Expertise in a true democracy would not be confined to intelligence 
testers, either in themselves or their subjects, but would rather be the realm of all. Even as 
Dewey engaged with Lippmann, he continued to criticize the tests. Even as he made his 
distinctive arguments about democracy and education, he drew on Lippmann’s ideas about 
democracy and expertise.   
 The heuristic of “the Lippmann-Dewey debate” has set democracy against expertise in 
much recent scholarship on American political thought. But the history of the Lippmann-
Terman controversy suggests that the relationship between democracy and expertise was a 
more complicated matter in the early twentieth century. For here a wider range of characters 
produced a subtler set of arguments about the politics of expertise in a democracy. There is 
Lippmann’s emphasis on making this politics democratic through public debate, and his 
interest in the cultural and rhetorical aspects of expert authority. There is Dewey’s basic 
agreement with Lippmann, as well as his broader argument for a universal aristocracy in which 
democracy itself becomes expert. And there is Terman’s case for scientific autonomy, in which 
expertise gets protected from public opinion while also guiding public policy. The controversy 
was framed by both anti-expert populism (Bryan) and anti-democratic criticism (Mencken), 
and it generated much anxiety among academics (Yerkes, Merriam, Warren). Yet here it did 
not seem possible for experts to isolate themselves from democracy, for mass society both 
generated and needed specialized knowledge and experts often intervened in politics. But nor 
was it plausible to put experts in charge of democracy, for their expertise could threaten 
democratic values and undermine democratic culture. Instead, the authority of amateurs over 
experts turned on the contested dynamics of the public controversies through which they 
engaged with each other politically. For Lippmann, these dynamics, with all their difficulties, 
ultimately meant that the politics of expertise had to make sense within, and neither resolve 
nor escape, the broader fact of democracy.  
